Wadee Ata
31 Jan, 2026
Since Foreign Minister Shayea al-Zindani was tasked with forming a new government in mid-January, discourse has intensified regarding political quotas (al-Muhassasah). To many, this system has become a tool for dividing influence and power, rather than a form of political partnership—which some argue is the bedrock of any democratic system.
Last Monday, the Yemen News Agency (SABA) reported ongoing, intensive consultations led by Prime Minister-designate Al-Zindani to form a new "Government of Competencies." The objective is to keep pace with the requirements of the exceptional phase the country is currently traversing.
The agency quoted a government source stating that consultations are expected to conclude within the coming days. The source emphasized that efforts are focused on selecting a cohesive government team capable of working with a sense of national responsibility.
What is Political Quota-Sharing (al-Muhassasah)?
Some view it as an extra-constitutional mechanism that distributes cabinet portfolios and government posts among political forces based on political, regional, or local affiliation. It takes into account the balance of power, influence, and the popular or military weight of each faction. However, in the Yemeni context—according to experts and analysts—it has devolved into a permanent governance pattern linked to the transitional phase that began in 2011.
The Yemeni experience with quota-based governments has been linked to the Republican era in various forms. However, 2011 marked a turning point following the stepping down of late President Ali Abdullah Saleh based on the GCC Initiative. This led to the "Government of National Accord" headed by Mohammed Salem Basindwa, the first government based on a 50/50 split between the General People’s Congress (GPC) and the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP).
Following the Houthi-Saleh alliance and the fall of Sana’a in September 2014, a new government was formed on November 7, 2014, led by Khaled Bahah. It included the JMP, the GPC, the Southern Movement, and ministers loyal to the Houthi group.
After President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi relocated to Aden in February 2015, declaring it the temporary capital, the Bahah government was reactivated (sans Houthis). This continued until his dismissal in April 2016 and the appointment of Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr. The new government maintained its consensus-based, quota-driven character, including the Islah Party, GPC, Socialists, Nasserites, and the Southern Movement.
The Bin Daghr government lasted until October 2018, followed by Maeen Abdulmalik. Leadership then passed to Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak in 2024, who resigned in 2025, followed by the recently resigned Salem bin Breik. Now, Shayea al-Zindani has been tasked with forming the anticipated cabinet.
How Have the Balances of Power Shifted?
Following his dismissal as Governor of Aden, Aidarous al-Zoubaidi gained Emirati support to establish the Southern Transitional Council (STC) on May 11, 2017, advocating for "secession and the restoration of the Southern State," backed by its own military forces.
What the Yemeni government described as a military rebellion by the STC—resulting in its control over state institutions and camps in Aden—represented a shift in the balance of power within the "Legitimacy" camp. This was reflected in the December 2020 restructuring of Maeen’s government, forced by the Riyadh Agreement as a "compulsory partnership" based on equal representation between North and South.
With the formation of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) in April 2022, STC influence was cemented with three of its leaders (Aidarous al-Zoubaidi, Abdulrahman al-Mahrami, and Faraj al-Bahsani) joining the council. This "compulsory partnership" remained the status quo until President Rashad al-Alimi dismissed the government earlier this month.
What Does the Constitution Say?
The Yemeni Constitution contains no mention of al-Muhassasah. In fact, it explicitly stipulates competence, equal opportunity, and the individual responsibility of each minister. However, quotas became a reality imposed by political and military variables that proved stronger than the presidency's capabilities.
What is the Difference?
Political consensus is based on a shared national program, where competencies are selected to implement it. Quotas, conversely, focus on dividing positions before any program is agreed upon. In Yemen, this often occurs at the expense of administrative and legal expertise. Consequently, "sovereign ministries" (Defense, Interior, Finance) are distributed according to sensitive balances, with ministers often chosen based on partisan or regional loyalty.
Quota-based systems result in governments with weak executive performance, reflecting the conflicting loyalties of their members. Responsibility and accountability vanish, administrative decision-making is paralyzed, and the bureaucracy inflates without actual achievement. Ministers transform from a national team into tools of influence and conflict. The inevitable result is failure, fueled by weak state institutions, rampant corruption, and the hollowed-out nature of professional public office.
While some see it as a way to avoid direct confrontation, the Yemeni "street" views government quotas as a means of dividing spoils. It is seen as the root cause of corruption, economic collapse, and a clear indication of the disconnect between the political elite and the suffering of the people.
Others argue it is difficult to bypass quotas entirely as they maintain a fragile balance. However, they insist on a Government of Competencies with clear powers, a binding program, and the separation of executive performance from political strife—alongside activated oversight and an end to the "multiplicity of decision-making centers."
Ultimately, political quotas in Yemen are no longer a tool for stability. Instead, they have become a primary driver of corruption and stagnation. Without comprehensive political reform, quota-based governments will remain a hallmark of crisis—serving the powers they represent rather than the people